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Determinants of Sovereign Defaults  
 
Abstract 
 
We study major sovereign defaults from 1970 to 2010 using an advanced duration analysis method. Descriptive 
analysis of the data indicates a cyclical nature of these defaults over a longer period. Regression results highlight 
the importance of the international monetary conditions as the volatilities of US treasury bills rates and USD-
denominated LIBOR exert significant impacts on defaults. Political uncertainty increases the probability of 
default. Export (import) growth reduces (increases) the probability of default. Similarly, a 1% increase in 
inflation would increase the probability of defaults by 7%. Higher debt/GDP ratio is also linked to higher 
probability of default. A 1% increase in external debt would lead to a five to 7% increase in the probability of 
default. Higher GDP per capita reduces the probability of default. A previous banking crisis is linked to higher 
chances of sovereign defaults. Further analysis of entry into (out of) sovereign defaults indicates that higher US 
treasury rates would initiate sovereign defaults and would make it difficult for countries to come out of default. 
The same is true for central government debt/GDP, higher current account deficit and exchange rate volatility.  
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1. Introduction  
Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) outlined how throughout history “this time is different” became a credo for private 
and public investors extensively engaged in sovereign lending, just to eventually face “yet another crisis.” In 
this regard, the recent European sovereign debt crisis is no exception. It started in 2007 with the U.S. subprime 
financial crisis, which came as a shock to most economies, thus cooling down growth internationally. This 
forced the newly elected Greek government to announce that the 2009 budget deficit would largely exceed 
expectations. In the subsequent (2010) Greek sovereign debt crisis, the government struggled not only with 
high public debt and low competitiveness compared to the rest of the euro zone, but also from a credibility 
deficit view point too (Tsoulakis, 2012). Before this incident, economists and capital markets seemed to have 
shared the belief that sovereign default would be an issue only experienced by developing countries. A 
defaulting developed country, and a member of the European Monetary Union (EMU), was not perceived as a 
possibility by the market. This allowed Greece (and other EMU members) to borrow at exceptionally low 
spreads over German bunds, creating a strong incentive to over borrow and accumulate remarkably high 
amounts of sovereign debt (Tsoulakis, 2012).  
 
Compared to late 1980s and early 1990s when financial markets cooled down and sovereign defaults were few 
leading to less academic research on foreign borrowing crisis, the number of studies since 2014 on sovereign 
debt crisis have been regularly forthcoming in particular of European countries. Some of these studies include 
Ucler & Kirmizioglu (2015), Tamborini (2015), Broto & Perez-Quiros (2015), Popov & Van Horen (2015), 
Smeets (2016), Moisescu & Giurescu (2016), Stamatopoulos et al. (2016), Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero 
(2016), Afonso & Silva (2017), Cencini (2017), Reusens & Croux (2017), and Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2017). A 
significant number of these studies have used time series models to evaluate credit default swaps (CDS) and 
other similar instruments to assess the riskiness of a country due to the ever rising burden of sovereign debt. 
This paper aims to develop an empirical model that helps to identify risk factors influencing the probability of 
sovereign default. The study builds a deep understanding of related economic theory and the findings of other 
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researchers that tried to identify “early warning signs” (such as Manasse & Roubini, 2009). We use a panel 
dataset distributed over 70 countries (developing as well as developed) from 1970 to 2010.  
 
The inclusion of a number of important variables in our study to model external debt defaults comprising 
political, regional, macroeconomic, financial and external trade and debt is useful and significantly advanced 
compared to existing empirical literature. Compared to a number of other studies mentioned above, our study 
uses more indicators to approximate in particular political conditions of a country.  Our study’s use of advanced 
statistical models such as duration (survival time) analysis is a significant addition and advancement to existing 
literature and a more up-to-date dataset comprising of both developed and developing countries makes this 
analysis a significant piece of research and a contribution to the ever developing empirical literature. The paper 
develops an understanding that the use of time-to-event methodology can have a significant advantage over 
other techniques such as simple logit or probit used so far for the analysis of sovereign debt analysis.  
 
2. Modelling the Determinates of Sovereign Defaults – A Review of Literature  
An interesting question is how creditors measure sovereign risk. While the calculation of country risk is more 
an art than a scientific econometric analysis (especially because of only qualitatively assessable political factors), 
sovereign risk as a part of the country risk is rated by well-known international agencies. These agencies only 
give hints on which variables they include in their analysis, but do not disclose details of their procedures (Fight, 
2004). Fight (2004) asserts that bank managers often faithfully refer to these ratings. This is consistent with 
Larraín et al. (1997), who present econometric evidence for the period 1987 to 1996, finding a highly significant 
announcement effect on financial markets for negative changes in credit ratings. They also state that sovereign 
risk ratings can be primarily explained with publicly available macroeconomic data (see also Cantor & Packer, 
1996; Manasse & Roubini, 2009; Eichler & Maltritz, 2012) and dollar-bond-spreads. 
 
In one of the most-cited recent empirical studies investigating determinants of sovereign default, Manasse and 
Roubini (2009, p. 3) complain that many “policymakers and analysts continue to use simple rules of thumb to 
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judge risks and to assess fiscal sustainability (IMF, 2003), as well as the soundness of macroeconomic policies.” 
According to Manasse and Roubine (2009), economists and practitioners struggled to properly understand 
macroeconomic and structural weaknesses leading to sovereign defaults. They also notice little comparative 
empirical work on the sovereign debt crises of the 1990s and early 2000s. The recent European sovereign debt 
crisis, however, seems to have drawn new attention to the issue. Villemont (2011) explains that even though 
there is a large body of literature trying to empirically identify determinates of sovereign defaults, most results 
can hardly be interpreted as representing causalities. In particular, endogeneity issues limit these efforts to 
identify risk factors associated with sovereign defaults. Popular approaches focus on central economic 
indicators, risk ratios or market estimates of sovereign risk (Das et al., 2012). The most popular explanatory 
variables are external or public debt to GDP as well as the public debt or debt service to government revenues 
ratios. 
 
Most studies use probit or logit regressions or signal models (Manasse & Roubini, 2009) to model sovereign 
defaults. Referring to the existing literature in this regard, Manasse and Roubini (2009) suggest that an empirical 
model attempting to predict sovereign default should include measures of solvency and liquidity as well as 
political, institutional or other variables that could represent a country’s willingness to pay. Many authors also 
emphasize the inclusion of variables on the macroeconomic state and volatility (Hilscher & Nosbusch, 2010; 
Villemont, 2011; Das et al., 2012), because they capture not only the ability, but also the willingness to pay 
(Manasse & Roubini, 2009). Das et al. (2012) describe research by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006, p. 6) 
which analyses default and restructuring clusters during the last 200 years and finds that debt crises were 
preceded by either a worsening in terms of trade, a recession in capital providing countries, a surge in the 
international costs of capital, or a crisis in a contagion-causing country. 
 
With a range of 50 predictor variables, Manasse and Roubini (2009) use a classification and regression tree 
(CART) methodology on a panel dataset including 47 market economies from 1970 to 2002. They claim to 
reach excellent predictive capacities in-sample, while the out-of-sample prediction includes less correct 
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predictions, but also less false alarms than the “Early Warning Signal (EWS)” literature. Moreover, they could 
identify ten variables as sufficient for the classification or prediction of a sovereign debt crisis. These include 
total external debt/GDP ratio; short-term debt reserves ratio; real GDP growth; public external debt/fiscal 
revenue ratio; CPI inflation; number of years to the next presidential election; U.S. treasury bills rate; external 
financial requirements (current account balance plus short-term debt as a ratio of foreign reserves); exchange 
rate overvaluation; and exchange rate volatility.  
 
Manasse and Roubini (2009) specify characteristics of a relatively “safe” country: total external debt over GDP 
ratios below 49.7%; short-term debt over reserves under 130%; public external debt as% of fiscal revenue not 
being higher than 214; and a maximum overvaluation of the exchange rate of 48%. They also outline three risk 
types: 1) unsustainability risk can be identified by external debt to GDP ratios over 49.7% in combination with 
monetary or fiscal imbalances and large needs of refinancing; 2) liquidity risk types show moderate debt levels, 
with short-term debt over reserves exceeding 130% and political uncertainty (no upcoming elections) as well 
as tight international capital markets; 3) macro-exchange rate risk types are significant in terms of low growth 
(-5.5%) combined with relatively fixed exchange rates. 
 
Our study contributes to the existing theoretical and empirical literature reviewed above. We model the 
sovereign default by using a number of variables discussed above and employing an advanced econometric 
method: survival (duration) analysis framework. The empirical analysis of our study is rich and would provide 
a good deal of information for creditors as well as debtor nations to manage future sovereign defaults and 
related costs. In the following, we discuss the duration (survival) analysis methodology for modelling sovereign 
defaults alongside justification for the chosen method.   
 
3. Methodology 
As mentioned before, the majority of the literature in this field has used logit or probit regression to identify 
risk factors associated with sovereign default. With the use of CART, Manasse and Roubini (2009) applied a 
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new methodology. Reinhart et al., (2003 as cited in Das et al., 2012), call past defaults a main predictor of 
defaults and debt restructurings. The large number and strong influence of time-dependent variables used in 
the existing empirical literature to explain external sovereign defaults in combination with the strong role of 
past events may make survival (duration) analysis an interesting option and a more appropriate method to 
define determinants or warning signs predictor of sovereign default.  
 
Although, to the author’s knowledge, there has been very few applications of duration (survival) analysis to 
model sovereign default (one of such is Cruces and Trebesch, 2013), it is repeatedly applied to measure the 
credit risk of bank loans or other financial instruments (see, for example, Li, 1999). For credit scoring or the 
prediction of default on credit cards, the use of statistical methods such as logistic regression has developed 
into a standard (Thomas et al., 2002). Survival analysis can improve this process by providing “forecasts as a 
function of time” (Banasik et al., 1999). It “allows us to model not just if a borrower will default, but when” 
(Bellotti & Crook, 2009, p. 1). Bellotti & Crook (2009) formulate another advantage of survival-analysis: 
compared to standard regression or logistic regression models, it allows for very natural incorporation of time-
varying covariates such as macroeconomic time-series data.  
 
Most data in social sciences can be considered continuous time data, as the behavioral processes that the data 
represent occur continuously. For example a person could lose job any time despite signing a long term contract. 
Nevertheless, it is usually grouped into time-intervals, forming discrete survival time data. Where the ratio of 
grouping-interval length to typical spell length is small, Jenkins (2005) recommends the use of continuous time 
specifications, as in a complementary log-log (cloglog) model. Although, the “cloglog” model seems attractive 
because of its approximation to the continuous-time piecewise constant exponential (PCE) model, the logit 
model is more commonly used in social sciences (Steele, 2011). It is also called “proportional odds model” 
(Jenkins, 2005) or “discrete-time proportional hazard model” (Steele, 2011). Sueyoshi (1995) demonstrated that 
a logistic model with interval-specific intercepts can be representative for an underlying continuous-time 
process, although by default it considers the underlying process to be a discrete-time one. Steele (2011) argues 
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that in practice both models produce very similar predictions as long as probabilities are small. Furthermore, 
some studies on sovereign default like Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) argue a period of up to three years around 
the actual default date could be considered sovereign debt crisis. When the actual date of an event within an 
interval is less important, “we can happily treat the process as truly discrete” (Steele, 2012, p. 3).  
 
This paper will, therefore, focus on using a logit model on country-period panel data (duration data) in order 
to analyze factors influencing the probability that a sovereign debtor defaults on its external debt obligations. 
Another point to consider is that most of the applications of survival analysis in financial contexts, however, 
only need to consider one default per “patient” (country in our case), because the lifetime of a debt contract 
usually ends with repayment or default. Throughout history, most sovereigns – especially now developed 
Western nations – defaulted multiple times (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). The occurrence of multiple spells per 
subject is usually discussed under the label “multiple failure-time” (Cleves, 2009). It is, however, important to 
distinguish between the analyses of “competing risks” where subjects are at risk of different exclusive events 
and “recurrent events.”  
 
With regards to employment transitions, Steele (2011, p. 2) describes recurrent events data as “a type of two-
level hierarchical structure with episodes of being at risk of an event nested within individuals, and individuals 
(subject) may themselves be nested within geographical areas or institutions (e.g. employers)…” This definition 
seems applicable to the data used in this study too: each country is continuously at risk of a transition either 
from default and “non-default” periods or vice versa. Cleves (2009) points out that this clustering of failure 
times within subjects is violating the assumption made in traditional survival analysis that failure times would 
be independent. The easiest way to avoid this violation is examining the time to first event (default) only. This, 
however, often leaves a large amount of data unused, wasting information that may have been relevant (Cleves, 
2009). Nevertheless, because of its simplicity, this study will initially follow this approach, excluding all country-
related observations after a country defaults for the first time, using a “proportional odds model.”  
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Analyzing the time to first default will only be beneficial for developing insights and patterns in the underlying 
data. For the analysis of the whole dataset, Steele (2011) proposes an extension to the simple proportional 
hazard model into what the author calls a random-effect or two-state model. Cleves (2009) describes two basic 
model classes used to analyze multiple event data: Frailty models and variance-corrected models. The model 
outlined by Steele (2011) would fall under Cleve’s (2009) definition of a frailty model, where “the association 
between failure times is explicitly modelled as a random-effect term, called the frailty.”  
 
Since individual country heterogeneity would remain unobserved in a single-level model, such as the simple 
logit model, subject (country)-specific effects will bias the duration dependence of the population hazard 
(Vauper et al., 1979). The inclusion of random-effects terms or “frailties” makes it possible to interpret 
coefficients as subject-specific or conditional, instead of population-averaged as is the case for single-level 
coefficients (Neuhaus et al., 1991). Additionally, it is important to respect the residual standard deviation ?̂?𝑢 
when interpreting the estimates in a random effects model. With larger inter-individual variance, the population-
averaged coefficients will increase in magnitude compared to estimates from the single-level model (Snijders & 
Bosker, 1994, p. 227-8). 
 
The data used in the following empirical analysis is continuous time data with interval-censored spell lengths. 
It will be analyzed using discrete-time methods. This means the continuous time axis can be split into a number 
of non-overlapping intervals [0 =  𝑎0 , 𝑎1), (𝑎1, 𝑎2], (𝑎2, 𝑎3], … , (𝑎𝑘−1, 𝑎𝑘 = ∞]. The interval boundaries 
𝑎0 = 0, 𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑘 are then represented by dates on the time axis. Nevertheless, applying the proportional 
odds model implicitly assumes an intrinsically discrete distribution of time, handling survival time 𝑇 as a discrete 
random variable with the probability density function 𝑓(𝑗) ≡ 𝑓𝑗 = Pr (𝑇 = 𝑗) where 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3, … } 
representing consecutive cycles instead of equally distributed intervals. This assumption is not visible in the 
dataset, because both sets of survival times would follow the same notation based on positive integers 𝑗. 
However, it influences the interpretation of survivor function and discrete time hazard functions (Jenkins, 
2005).  
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The survivor function 𝑆(𝑗) shows the probability of “survival” or, put more generally, of not experiencing an 
event (default in our case) within 𝑗 cycles. The whole function is given by:  
𝑆(𝑗) = Pr(𝑇 ≥ 𝑗) + ∑ 𝑓𝑘
∞
𝑘=𝑗
. 
(1) 
Correspondingly, the function ℎ(𝑗) is the conditional probability of experiencing an event during cycle 𝑗. This 
is called the discrete time hazard defined as: 
ℎ(𝑗) = Pr(𝑇 = 𝑗|𝑇 ≥ 𝑗) =  
𝑓(𝑗)
𝑆(𝑗 − 1)
. 
(2) 
The cumulative distribution function of 𝑇, also called failure function, is denoted by 𝐹(𝑗). The discrete time 
failure function is: 
𝐹𝑗 = 𝐹(𝑗) = 1 − 𝑆(𝑗) = 1 − ∏(1 − ℎ𝑘
𝑗
𝑘=1
). 
(3) 
Based on these assumptions, the “proportional odds model” can then be written as:  
ℎ(𝑗, 𝑋)
1 − ℎ(𝑗, 𝑋)
= [
ℎ0(𝑗)
1 − ℎ0(𝑗)
] exp(𝛽′𝑋) 
⇒ log 𝑖𝑡 [ℎ(𝑗, 𝑋)] = log [
ℎ(𝑗, 𝑋)
1 − ℎ(𝑗, 𝑋)
] =  𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽
′𝑋. 
(4) 
This models the discrete time hazard ℎ(𝑗, 𝑋) as the relative probability of an event in cycle 𝑗 based on survival 
up to this point in time. This probability is influenced by two factors: relative odds that take the same value for 
the whole population and a scaling-factor that is specific to each individual country. While 𝑋 is a matrix 
containing the observations of explanatory variables and 𝛽 represents the corresponding coefficients, 𝑎𝑗 =
logit [ℎ0 (𝑗)] with ℎ0 (𝑗) being the so called “baseline hazard” for 𝑋 = 0. Thus, 
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ℎ(𝑗, 𝑋) =
1
1 + exp(−𝑎𝑗 − 𝛽′𝑋)
, 
(5) 
This is the “logistic hazard model” (as outlined in Jenkins, 2005), which can be estimated using maximum 
likelihood methods. In Stata its estimation is possible with the logit command.  
 
As Jenkins (2005, p. 44) puts it: “The choice of shape of hazard function in these models is up to the 
investigator…” One possibility is to assume a baseline hazard, a time-dependent probability for an event that 
is underlying each individual’s specific risk, based on economic theory. One interesting option could be to 
assume the duration dependent baseline hazard to be represented by 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑟 log(𝑗). This would be a discrete-
time equivalent to the continuous-time Weibull model. It also allows for some flexibility, because the coefficient 
𝑟 would be estimated alongside the intercept and the 𝛽-values. Where 𝑟 > 0 (𝑟 < 0), the baseline hazard will 
be monotonically increasing (decreasing). A constant baseline hazard will be represented by 𝑟 = 0. 
 
Another option to derive the baseline hazard, especially for discrete-time data is the use of life table estimators 
that produce estimates for the survival and hazard functions, using an “average” estimate of 𝑛𝑗, the number of 
individual countries that have left the sample at the midpoint of each interval of time 𝐼𝑗 with 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 ∶
𝐼𝑗: [𝑡𝑗, 𝑡𝑗+1). The adjustment is needed to account for the fact that continuous data is grouped in discrete 
intervals; where the underlying process is assumed to be intrinsically discrete, it becomes unnecessary (Jenkins, 
2005). 
 
Jenkins (2005) specifies that for each interval 𝐼𝑗, the number of countries at risk of default is 𝑁𝑗 (the so-called 
“risk sample”), the number of observed defaults is 𝑑𝑗, and the number of censored spell endings is 𝑚𝑗. Then 
𝑛𝑗 = 𝑁𝑗 −  
𝑑𝑗
2
 and thus the estimate for the survival function is:  
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?̂?(𝑗) =  ∏(1 −
𝑑𝑘
𝑛𝑘
𝑗
𝑘=1
). 
(6) 
With S(t) = 1 − F(t) this gives an estimate for the density function 
𝑓(𝑗) =
?̂?(𝑗 + 1) − ?̂?(𝑗)
𝑡𝑗+1 − 𝑡𝑗
=
?̂?(𝑗) − ?̂?(𝑗 + 1)
𝑡𝑗+1 − 𝑡𝑗
 
(7) 
The hazard rate can then be estimated using S̃(k) = (Ŝ(k) + Ŝ(k + 1))/2 as: 
𝜃(𝑗) =
[𝑓(𝑗)]
?̃?(𝑗)
. 
(8) 
The command ltable in STATA offers life table estimates of the survival function. With ltable, the 
corresponding hazard rates can also be accessed.  
 
In order to estimate the probability of a transition either into default or out of default, a re-specification of the 
above outlined logit model is necessary. In the following, a two-state model like that developed by Steele (2011) 
will be developed. The single-state logistic model is looking at the conditional probability that an individual 
country j experiences an event (default) at time t given that it did not have an event, yet. This holds the 
expectation that each individual country can only experience one event over the observation period. In order 
to account for the possibility that more than one event may occur and that there is more than one type of event 
with corresponding states (s = 1, 2), it is necessary to distinguish the time of the study t into the time spent in 
each episode i.  
 
An event such as the exit from state 1 automatically implies entrance into the other state (2). At this point it 
would be necessary to start counting the periods spent in this state until another transition back into state 1 or 
the end of the study. Where entry into the study or exit from it, as well transitions between states are considered 
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an event, each individual country’s time in the study can be split into one or more episodes defined as all 
consecutive periods between two events. The state individual country j inherits at the beginning of a cycle 
interval (or cycle) t in episode i is denoted by Stij. Implementing these considerations, Steele (2011, p. 9) 
describes the “multilevel event history model for transitions between the two states” as: 
logit(𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) =  𝒂𝑠
′ 𝒛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝜷𝒔
′𝑿𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑠𝑗, 𝑠 = 1, 2. 
(9) 
Here, as
′ zstij specifies the baseline logit-hazard (defined by αj in the single-state logit model). With ytij being 
the binary indicator for state transition during interval t, the probability that individual country j leaves state s 
in interval (or cycle) t conditional on no previous state-transition in that episode is:  
𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 = (𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝑦𝑡 ′𝑖𝑗 = 0 for t
′ < 𝑡, 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑗 = s). 
(10) 
One feature of this model is that the baseline logit-hazard, the explanatory variables with their coefficients, and 
the frailty can vary between the two states. This model can easily be estimated in Stata using the xtmelogit or 
xtlogit command with 𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑗 as the dependent variable and interacting 𝒛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 and 𝑿𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 with dummy variables for 
each state as explanatory variables. The state-identifying dummies are also included as explanatory variables 
and replace the intercept. 
 
4. Data 
The data used in this study can be grouped in different broad areas: data identifying financial crises, variables 
describing a country’s economic situation, political situation, or the quality of a government’s financial and 
monetary policy. Apart from these explanatory variables, the longitudinal panel dataset contains structural 
variables (e.g., different time scales and indicators of the beginnings and ends of default episodes) that are 
necessary to conduct the analyses described in the previous section. 
 
In all the empirical analysis conducted in this study, the dependent variable is based on Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
(2010a) dates for external sovereign debt default. They define external debt crisis as involving “outright default 
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on payment of debt obligations incurred under foreign legal jurisdiction, including non-payment, repudiation, 
or the restructuring of debt into terms less favorable to the lender than in the original contract” (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2010a, p. 1679). This limits the dataset to the 70 countries analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) 
between 1800 and 2010. The option to extend this indicator by constructing a default variable based on 
Standard and Poor’s studies and the occurrence of “large” IMF loans, as suggested by Roubini & Setser (2003), 
Tomz and Wright (2007), or Manasse and Roubini (2009), was considered but discarded in favor of consistency 
in the dependent variable.  
 
The publicly available sources for (macro-) economic data, for example, the International Monetary Fund 
(2013a, 2013c), the World Bank (2013a, 2013b), or the OECD (2009), limit the scope of the constructed dataset 
to yearly observations from 1960 to 2010 for each country. This time span was reduced to 1970 to 2010 due to 
gaps in the data, resulting in a total of 2870 observations. Possible explanatory variables like ratings of sovereign 
bonds, and mainly debt-related variables like short-term debt over reserves and volumes of debt services were 
excluded because of their limited range and large gaps.  
 
The number of observations in the resulting full dataset is large compared to other studies: Manasse et al (2003) 
and Masse and Roubini (2009) use a panel dataset for 76 countries from 1970 to 2002, but with limited range 
(1995 to 2002) for about 30 transition economies and further gaps in the data. Hilscher and Nosbusch’s (2010) 
data ranges from 1970 to 2007 for 31 emerging market countries and Villemont’s (2012) works with 93 
countries between 1970 and 2004. Most other studies that tried to identify risk indicators on sovereign default 
focus on one or a few chosen explanatory aspects (Das et al., 2012). As will be explained in the following 
section, the analysis in this study is conducted in consecutive steps. In a first step, only data until the first default 
will be considered. Therefore, all country-specific periods after the first year in default were deleted. For 
countries that have been in default in the first observation periods, these observations were excluded, because 
the aim of the analysis is to identify determinants influencing a transition into default not characteristics of 
default periods. In subsequent estimations, the whole dataset is used, but observations are distinguished by 
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whether or not the country is in default. Table 1 lists all 70 countries in the dataset with their default (if any) 
periods, assigned “id,” the years of the observations considered for the first-default-only analysis, whether they 
defaulted (value equal to “1” otherwise “0”) and default episodes in the full dataset. For each explanatory 
variable used, Table 2 includes a brief description and its origin.  
 
5. Estimation and Explanation 
As outlined in the previous section, this study follows a stepwise extension of the used methodology in order 
to make use of the whole scope of the collected data. In a first step, a logit or “proportional odds model” will 
be used to estimate the probability of external sovereign default. Life table estimates of the survivor (not going 
into default) and hazard function (risk of going into default) should help to specify an appropriate baseline 
logit-hazard. A number of explanatory variables are used subsequently to model first default probability. In a 
next step, the same explanatory variables will be used with the two-stage model on the full dataset. This model 
should give an impression on the effect of these variables not only on the occurrence, but also the end of a 
default period. The main purpose of this is to show how multiple-failure methodology can be used to model 
external sovereign default compared to single-event methodology.  
 
Figure 1 shows the survivor function plotted from life table estimates on the first-default-only dataset. The 
shape of the survivor function shows a steadily decreasing, but still high probability (> 90%) of survival for the 
first ten years in the risk set. Within the next five years, a sudden drop reduces the probability of survival to an 
average level around 60%. From then on, the survival rates reduce fairly slowly and in a linear pattern to a mean 
47% after 40 years. Correspondingly, the estimated hazard rates (Figures 2) are almost constant (around 1.5%) 
until year 12 of the observation period with the interval from year ten to eleven being an exception with a 
hazard rate of 4.65%. The hazard rates spike in the following three intervals with average values of ten, nine 
and 17%. From there onwards, the hazard rates quickly decline to 2.7% and stay almost constant for all intervals 
between periods 22 and 40, where the observation period ends with a hazard rate of 3.0%.  
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The spikes in the intervals between the 12th and 15th year may be explained historically. The observation period 
starts in 1970. This means the observed surge in defaults in the years 12 to 15 is caused by the Latin American 
sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s1. This raises the following question: how does one handle and treat these 
hazard rates in the estimation of the logistic model? A look at the 95%-confidence intervals of the estimated 
hazard rates (represented in Figure 2 and Figure 3 by the vertical lines) reveals that assuming an almost linear 
hazard function would not be too implausible. This could mean that the distribution is actually biased by the 
actual historical events. Another possibility is that the pattern represents certain cyclical effects regarding 
external sovereign defaults. It could be interesting to investigate this further using different samples and maybe 
with multiple-default data. Figure 3 shows the hazard rates when grouped into more or less than 15 years at 
risk of default. While the function for the intervals up to year 15 resembles the upward reaching half of a 
parable, the pattern in the remaining periods is almost constant. Thus, we consider two different logit models: 
One “general model” assuming a baseline hazard of 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑟 log(𝑗), as described in the previous section, allows 
for some flexibility as it estimates the actual shape along with other parameters; and a more “specific model” 
with the observations after year 15 being represented by a dummy variable.  
 
The regression results can be seen in Table 3. For each version of the model, we estimated three specifications 
to observe the sensitivity of estimates. These include full model (coefficients and odd ratios presented in column 
1 & 2), excluding political and regional variables (column 3) and dropping variables representing volatility 
(column 4). Both versions (general and specified) produce significant estimates for the baseline hazard. 
However, the “specific model” produces overall more significant coefficients and has a slightly higher Pseudo 
R-squared (0.76 compared to 0.74 in the general model). An interesting effect is that the tendency in some 
already very large (or very small) odds ratio takes values suspiciously larger (smaller) in the specific model. 
 
                                                 
1 Excluding Latin American countries from the sample produced significantly lower hazard rates (around 5% to 6% for these time 
periods).  
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The variables “regime” and “ht_region2” are categorical variables that represent a country’s political regimes 
and geographical regions. In order to interpret their effects appropriately, the different categories would need 
to be included separately in the form of dummy variables. This, however, was not possible since Stata logit 
routines omitted multiple categories for “perfectly predicting” sovereign defaults in the first-default-only 
sample. While the estimates for regime are not significant, the geographical region appears to have a significant 
influence (5%-significance level).  
 
Hughes & MacDonald (2002) and Fight (2004) stress the influence of political, economic, and social factors 
for sovereign risk. In particular, the use of political factors makes the analysis more complicated, since there is 
very limited agreement on how to quantify them. A proper theory is missing. However, approaches like 
Borensztein & Panizza (2009), who refer to the decreased probability of re-election for defaulting governments 
as a cost of default, demonstrate the importance of political factors. The variables “preselec,” no_preselec,” 
“t_pres,” “legelec,” and “t_leg” have been included in light of these theoretical considerations. For presidential 
and parliamentary (/legislative) election, a dummy (preselec, legelec) indicates election years. The dummies 
no_preselec and no_legelec have been constructed to indicate periods where there was no prospect for coming 
elections (1 = election times; 0 = no elections). The variables t_pres and t_leg are the times since the last 
election interacted with no_legelec and no_preselec in order to avoid missing values in no-election years.  
 
The only significant estimate is on the 10%-level for preselect in the specified model. According to the odds 
ratio, the risk of a sovereign default during a presidential election year would be 27 times that of any other year, 
which seems to be a rather extreme value. One possible explanation could be that the newly-elected government 
is at minimum risk of not being re-elected, because the next election date will be further away. Another reason, 
however, comes from Manasse et al. (2003), who use presidential election years to account for political 
uncertainty that results in economic uncertainty, which increases the risk of default. 
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“Van_index” and “fh_status” are other political indicators. While for the van_index higher values stand for 
more democratic institutions, the Freedom House status takes values of one, two or three for relatively free, 
partially free, or not free countries. While the insignificant estimates for the Van-Index would suggest that more 
democratic institutions are less likely to default, the highly (1%-level) significant Freedom House status 
coefficients indicate much less default in less free countries. These interpretations would make sense if one 
assumes that democratic countries are perceived as less likely to default in the market, and can therefore more 
easily amass higher debt levels, which increase the risk of a sovereign default. In an effort to test this further, 
we dropped fh_status variable and run the regression again. This produced a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient of van_index (10% significance level). This further confirms the above point. The correlation 
coefficient between van_index and fh_status is -0.8383 which perhaps explains the above result in the sense 
that fh_status captures the main effect in the presence of both variables been used in the regression. Manasse 
and Roubini (2009) also argue with proportional representation that the most frequent electoral system would 
also be the most frequent to default. A more detailed inspection of the data reveals that majority of the countries 
with fh_status values equal to 3 are those one where decision to default is made predominantly not based on 
market feedback and ground realities but rather by one or few individuals at the helm of affairs2. 
  
The variables “g7_us,” “g7_us_vol” and “libor_6us_vol” are included to represent monetary conditions in 
important capital-lending countries. Other G7-state yields have been considered, but were discarded for being 
highly collinear. Manasse and Roubini (2009) describe how contractions in the G7 may result in reduced capital 
flows to other markets. While they do not have a significant influence in the general model, in the specific 
model the approximated volatilities of US treasury bill and USD-denominated LIBOR are significant at the 
5%-level. An interesting result is that both volatilities seem to have a strong impact (large coefficients/odds 
ratios) which is negative for the US treasury bill, but positive for the LIBOR. The negative coefficient for the 
volatility of the treasury bills should probably be interpreted together with the coefficients for its absolute value.  
 
                                                 
2 Some of these countries include Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Thailand, Russia, Myanmar, Egypt, Chili, Algeria and China.  
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The inclusion and choice of macroeconomic variables and their approximated volatilities are motivated mainly 
from the insights of Catao and Sutton (2002), Manasse et al. (2003), and Manasse and Roubini (2009). These 
are the inflation rate (“infl;” “infl_vol3”), exchange rates (“xrat_avg;” “xrat_avg_vol3”), and the terms of trade 
(“tot”). Other variables (“exp_gr” = export growth in %; “exp_imp” = exports to imports ratio; “trade_gdp” 
= volume of exports plus imports as a ratio of the GDP) have been added to investigate effects of direction 
and volume of international trade flows. Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2006) identify a worsening in terms of 
trade as a source of default risk (Das et al., 2012). Theoretically, default reduces trade volumes as it hurts a 
country’s credibility and reduces its access to trade credits (Yeyati & Panizza, 2011). Less favorable terms of 
trade reduce incentives to conduct trade, which reduces the expected costs of a default and thereby the incentive 
for repayment. Furthermore, Hilscher and Nobusch (2010) found that countries strong in exports are exposed 
to external shocks more severely. According to them, the volatility of the terms of trade serves as a statistically 
and economically significant predictor for sovereign default spreads.  
 
While neither of the models finds the terms of trade or trade as a ratio of GDP to be significant, each model 
reports highly significant negative estimates of the export growth and significantly positive coefficients for the 
exports to imports ratio. In different previous versions of the model, the growth of import volumes was 
included and seemed to positively affect the default probability. Here, an increase in the export volume growth 
of one% reduces the annual hazard rate by ten%. The most obvious explanation is that export streams generate 
revenues to the country which positively influence its solvency, whereas imports are associated with an outflow 
of capital and therefore negatively affect the trade balance.3 It is then interesting to see that the export over 
import ratio has such a strong positive influence for the default probability (note that exp_imp is not denoted 
in % but in absolute terms, which relativizes the size of this effect). The key to this lies in the negative 
relationship between overall trade volumes and the risk of default (see, for example the negative coefficient for 
                                                 
3 The significance of the trade balance may explain the insignificance of the current account balance (“ca_net”) that could only 
contribute to the analysis through influential changes in the factor income or cash transfers. 
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trade_gdp or the above explanations regarding the terms of trade). This could be an indication that it is more 
likely that the export/import-ratio increases by a reduction in the import volumes than by an increase in the 
volume of exports. This overall reduction in the trade volumes would explain the positive coefficient. 
  
Both models identify the inflation and exchange rate variables as highly significant. Manasse et al. (2003) use 
highly volatile inflation to identify political uncertainty and high inflation as a measure of monetary 
mismanagement. Low inflation, for example, would indicate macroeconomic stability which appeals to potential 
investors. Both the general and specific models show similar effects: while a one% increase in the absolute 
inflation rate leads to a seven% higher per annum risk of default (or hazard), this risk decreases by the same 
amount for each point increase in the approximated 5-year inflation volatility. This finding is consistent with 
the classical economic theory, particularly Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), where sovereign borrowing serves as 
insurance against output contractions and defaulters are excluded from future lending. More specifically, the 
authors argue that higher volatilities act as a deterrent to sovereign defaults.  All those countries with volatile 
macroeconomic conditions mostly depend on foreign borrowing to smooth their future consumption. 
Defaulting on foreign debt would invite harsh penalties for ‘bad borrowers’ in particular of exclusion from 
future borrowing4.  In this regard, higher macroeconomic volatility would make a country more dependent on 
its foreign investors and therefore less likely to default (for further discussion in this regard, see also Catao & 
Sutton, 2002).  
 
Similarly, direct effects can be observed for the exchange rate and its approximated five-year volatility. The 
(highly) significant coefficients of the debt-to-GDP ratios support the existing literature. Not surprisingly, they 
have a positive influence on the risk of default. The influence of a one% increase in the total amount of external 
debt is five% (seven% for the specified model) higher hazard rates, which is one (three)% larger than the 
                                                 
4 A number of authors found evidence for an exclusion form international credit markets following a default (Aguiar and Gopinath, 
2006; Amador, 2009; Arellano, 2008; Asonuma, 2010; Mendoza and Yue, 2008; Tomz and Wright, 2007; and Yue, 2010; as cited in 
Das et al., 2012) 
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influence of a one% increase in the total central debt over GDP ratio. Also not surprising is the very significant 
negative relationship between current GDP per capita or its growth rates and the occurrence of a default. 
Potential endogeneity-issues have not been addressed; therefore, the estimated coefficient can only be 
interpreted as a correlation not causation.  
 
One more explanatory variable, which is significant at the 1%-level, is a dummy indicating banking crises 
(“cr_bk_lag1”). It has been lagged by one period to account for the controversial causality between banking 
and currency crises. It appears that in the general model, the risk of entering into default is 35 times higher in 
a period following a period with a banking crisis (27 times in the specified model). Both models have a 
significantly negative intercept and baseline hazard. The baseline hazard in the specified model is distinctly 
more negative: While the coefficient 𝑟 is -2.87 for all periods in the general model, periods one to 14 in the 
specified model follow a baseline logit-hazard with a coefficient of -14.74, the consecutive periods have a 
constant baseline hazard which reduces the intercept by -11.54. The lower baseline hazards in the specified 
model probably make up for the larger odds ratios for the explanatory variables.  
 
In a next step, the two-state model with the same explanatory variables should give an impression of whether 
or not the findings from the first-default-only dataset can be applied to the full default dataset. One issue that 
may influence the transferability is that the exclusion of each country after its first default makes the analysis 
highly vulnerable to historical occurrences such as international financial crises. Countries are connected via 
international trade, financial- and capital markets. Ongoing globalization makes them more vulnerable to 
systemic risk and contagion (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) claim that an analysis of 
sovereign default with data limited to only a few recent decades would be insufficient to identify and account 
for the very long cycles of sovereign defaults. The two-way model could in this regard be a first step to explore 
the usability of duration (survival) methodology for the analysis of these long cycles. The separation of 
observations into two or more different states may also give an impression of how certain indicators change 
from entrance to exit of a spell like sovereign default crisis.  
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Table 4 contains the estimates of the two-way model as specified in the methodology section. Similar to first 
default analysis, we estimated three different specifications for both out of and into default (column 1, 3 & 4). 
For subsequent discussion, we mainly focus on our main specification estimates and related odds ratios (column 
1&2). Overall, there are fewer significant coefficients. Furthermore, many estimates became very insignificant 
and would probably be excluded from a more thorough analysis. For the purpose of this study, it is, however, 
interesting to see how the estimates change with the use of multiple-spell data and a frailty-model that addresses 
individual heterogeneity. The standard deviation of the random effects terms ?̂?𝑢 of 0.001 seems to be fairly low 
indicating that the magnitudes of the coefficients would differ too much from the ones in the single-level model 
(Snijders & Bosker, 1994, p. 227-8). For the transition out of default, the constant is significantly positive and 
the significant coefficient for the baseline logit-hazard is distinctly more negative than for the transition into 
default.  
 
One important point to notice is that the baseline hazard for the transition into default, which can be thought 
of as the probability of defaulting ceteris paribus (given none of the explanatory variables in the model change), 
seems not to be appropriately represented by 𝑟 log (𝑗) anymore. This may be due to the fact that the multiple-
default dataset analyses the whole default and non-default episodes whereas in the first-default-only dataset it 
was unknown when the spell at the beginning of the observation period originally started. Focusing only on 
significant coefficients, the two-state model allows stating that the interest rate of the US treasury bill is 
associated negatively with the end of a sovereign debt crisis and positively with its beginning. Manasse et al. 
(2003), Borri and Verdelhan (2011) and Longstaff et al. (2011) find the same effect and argue that monetary 
conditions in the G7 influence emerging markets’ abilities to refinance, which may drive them to a liquidity 
crisis. The total central debt over GDP ratio seems to be positively associated with defaulting and negative with 
the end of a default spell. Interesting findings include the positive coefficient of the current account balance 
for transition into default and the change in direction for the effect of the approximated exchange rate volatility 
on default, which is now positive. It is, however, important to note that the model was not tested for 
misspecification which is probably an issue with so many insignificant coefficients.  
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6. Conclusion 
Sovereign debt crises are frequently reoccurring, often contagious international events. History has seen 
multiple episodes of amassed sovereign defaults, mainly in developing countries. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
call their occurrence cyclical. Even though all involved economic agents should be aware of the threat of 
sovereign defaults, it appears that the international capital markets repeatedly underestimate this risk. Related 
decision-making is often based on perception rather than a thorough technical analysis (Hughes & MacDonald, 
2002). There simply is no such thing as a reliable prediction of sovereign default as the analysis is more art than 
science (Fight, 2004). 
 
The aim of this paper is to estimate determinants of sovereign default using a comprehensively constructed 
panel-dataset with yearly observations for 70 countries between 1970 and 2010. The gaps in the data reduce the 
number of observations in the final model to 1953. Survival (duration) analysis was used for this purpose as 
this methodology addresses some distinct features of sovereign debt data: as most data in the social sciences is 
continuous time data that is grouped into discrete intervals; most explanatory variables are time-varying; and it 
can accommodate country-specific heterogeneity when estimating population-related coefficients. The analysis 
followed two steps: in a first step, a logit or proportional odds model was used to analyze the times from 1970 
until the first observed default. This type of model is commonly used in social sciences for the estimation of 
discrete-time data. It allows for easy inclusion of time-varying covariates and can be approximately 
representative for underlying continuous time processes. 
 
Several explanatory variables have been excluded based on economic theory and experiences of earlier 
approaches to model the risk of sovereign default. A basic problem all estimations face is that identified effects 
can hardly be interpreted as causalities due to the involvement of complex macroeconomic processes. For 
example, the dependent variable can often cause trends in one or more of the independent variables (Villemont, 
2011). A good example is the simultaneous occurrence of different financial crises, for example, banking and 
sovereign debt crises. A sovereign default can cause domestic contagion and thus motivate banking crises. 
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However, banking crises also possess the power to cool down an economy, forcing a sovereign into default. 
Zettelmeyer (2012) speaks of a standard reverse causality problem. The estimated logit model finds significant 
negative effects on the risk of survival (not defaulting) from macroeconomic volatilities in the interest rates of 
the US treasury bill and LIBOR, as well as inflation. The seminal model by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) can 
help to explain this: it assumes sovereign borrowing to be an insurance against the occurrence of output 
contractions. Creditors punish with exclusion from future lending when a sovereign debtor defaults. 
Macroeconomic volatility may increase the perceived need for insurance against future “bad times.” This 
finding is consistent with Catao and Sutton (2002), Manasse et al. (2003), Manasse and Roubini (2009). 
 
Manasse and Roubini (2009) explain that in a presidential election year, the rising political risk increases the 
economic risk and thus the probability for a default to happen. This study supports this finding with a highly 
significant positive effect of presidential election years. While the terms of trade are not significant, growth of 
the export volumes is representing rising revenues to the country, and thus significantly indicates reduced 
default probabilities. However, rises in the export over import ratio cause a higher likelihood of default, which 
can be explained assuming that it is more likely to be caused by reduced imports than increased exports. The 
overall reduced trade levels positively affect the default risk. Low exchange rates indicate political and monetary 
stability, which is attractive to investors. The coefficient, thus, has a negative sign. This study can also replicate 
the widely-used results that debt-over-GDP ratios have positive effects and GDP levels as well as growth rates 
have negative effects on the risk of default. A one-period lagged indicator of banking crises positively indicates 
sharp rises in the default probability.  
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Table 1 Sample of Countries and Default Periods 
Country id First Default Only 
Dataset  
Multiple Default Dataset  Country id First Default Only 
Dataset  
Multiple Default Dataset 
Years Default  Default Periods  Years Default Default Periods 
Algeria 1 1970 - 1991 1 1991 – 1996 
 Korea (South) 36 1970 - 2010 0  
Angola 2 1970 - 1985 1 1985 – 2003  Malaysia 37 1970 - 2010 0  
Argentina 3 1970 - 1982 1 1982 – 1993 2001 - 2005  Mauritius 38 1970 - 2010 0  
Australia 4 1970 - 2010 0   Mexico 39 1970 - 1982 1 1982–1990 
Austria 5 1970 - 2010 0   Morocco 40 1970 - 1983 1 1983 1986–1990 
Belgium 6 1970 - 2010 0   Myanmar 41 1970 - 2002 1 2002–2010 
Bolivia 7 1970 - 1980 1 1980 – 1984 1986 – 1997  Netherlands 42 1970 - 2010 0  
Brazil  8 1970 - 1983 1 1983 – 1994 2002  New Zealand 43 1970 - 2010 0  
Canada 9 1970 - 2010 0   Nicaragua 44 1970 - 1979 1 1979–2010 
Central African Republic 10 1970 - 1981 1 1981 1983 - 2010  Nigeria 45 1970 - 1982 1 1982–1992 2001 2004–
2005 Chile 11 1970 - 1983 1 1972 1974–1975 1983–
1990 
 Norway 46 1970 - 2010 0  
China 12 1970 - 2010 0   Panama 47 1970 - 1983 1 1983 – 1996 
Colombia 13 1970 - 2010 0   Paraguay 48 1970 - 1986 1 1986 – 1992 2003–2004 
Costa Rica 14 1970 - 1981 1 1981 1983 – 1990  Peru 49 1970 - 1976 1 1976 1978 1980 1984–1997 
Cote d'Ivoire 15 1970 - 1983 1 1983 – 1998 2000–2010  Philippines 50 1970 - 1981 1 1981–1992  
Denmark 16 1970 - 2010 0   Poland 51 1970 - 1981 1 1981–1994 
Dominican Republic 17 1970 - 1982 1 1982 – 1994 2005  Portugal 52 1970 - 2010 0  
Ecuador 18 1970 - 1982 1 1982 – 1995 1999–2000 
2008 
 Romania 53 1970 - 1981 0 1981 – 1983 1986  
Egypt 19 1970 - 1985 1 1984  Russia 54 1987 - 1991 1 1970 – 1986 1991–2000 
El Salvador 20 1970 - 2010 0   Singapore 55 1970 - 2010 0  
Finland 21 1970 - 2010 0   South Africa 56 1970 - 1985 1 1985 – 1987 1989 1993 
France  22 1970 - 2010 0   Spain 57 1970 - 2010 0  
Germany 23 1970 - 2010 0   Sri Lanka 58 1970 - 1979 1 1979 1981–1983 
Ghana 24 1971 - 1974 1 1970 1974 1987  Sweden 59 1970 - 2010 0  
Greece 25 1970 - 2010 0   Switzerland 60 1970 - 2010 0  
Guatemala 26 1970 - 1986 1 1986 1989  Taiwan 61 1970 - 2010 0  
Honduras 27 1970 - 1981 1 1981 – 2010  Thailand 62 1970 - 2010 0  
Hungary 28 1970 - 2010 0   Tunisia 63 1970 - 1979 1 1979– 982 
Iceland 29 1970 - 2010 0   Turkey 64 1970 - 1978 1 1978 – 1979 1982 2001 
India 30 1970 - 1972 1 1972 – 1976  UK 65 1970 - 2010 0  
Indonesia 31 1971 - 1998 1 1970 1998–2000 2002  US 66 1970 - 2010 0  
Ireland 32 1970 - 2010 0   Uruguay 67 1970 - 1983 1 1983–85 1987 1990–91 
2003 Italy 33 1970 - 2010 0   Venezuela 68 1970 - 1983 1 1983–88 1990 1995–97 
2004–05 Japan 34 1970 - 2010 0   Zambia 69 1970 - 1983 1 1983 – 1994 
Kenya 35 1970 - 1994 1 1994 – 2003  Zimbabwe 70 1975 - 2000 1 1970–1974 2000–2009 
Note:  This table contains information on the overage of countries and defaults episode periods. First default analysis data is comprised of data rows for each country until the first incident of default (denoted by default =1 and 0 
otherwise). For multiple defaults and transition into and out of default, the dataset comprises of each country name alongside the periods when a country experienced default. The dummy variable =1 is recorded for all those periods 
when a country remained unable to service debt and 0 otherwise.     
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Table 2 Description and Source of Dependent and Independent Variables  
Variable name Description Source5 
cr_esd Dummy indicating external sovereign default (=1) RR 
y Dummy, indicating transition into and out of default Constructed using cr_esd 
y_def Dummy indicating a transition into default (=1) Constructed using cr_esd 
y_nodef Dummy indicating a transition out of default (=1) Constructed using cr_esd 
s_def Dummy indicating the country is in default (=1) Constructed using cr_esd 
s_nodef Dummy indicating the country is not in default (=1) Constructed using cr_esd 
t Counting the years from start (1970) to end (2010) of the 
observation period with 1970=1; 2010=41. In the first-
default-only dataset, t has been adjusted for the four 
countries with delayed entry, taking “0” in the entry-year. 
 
defaultct Counting a country’s transitions into default. (1970=0) Constructed using cr_esd 
cr_bk_lag1 One year lagged dummy indicating the country suffers 
from a banking crisis 
cr_bk 
ht_region2 Categorical variable for the geographical region: (1) 
Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central 
Asia) (2)  Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the 
Dominican Republic) (3)  North Africa & the Middle East 
(including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus) (4)  Sub-Saharan 
Africa (5)  Western Europe and North America (including 
Australia &New Zeeland) (6)  East Asia (including Japan 
& Mongolia) (7)  South-East Asia (8)  South Asia 
Hadenius, Teorell & Wahman (2007) as cited 
in QoGst 
regime Categorical variable for the form of government: (1) 
Parliamentary democracy; (2) Semi-presidential 
democracy; (3) Presidential democracy;  (4) Civilian 
dictatorship; (5) Military dictatorship; (6) Royal 
dictatorship; 
Constructed using data from Cheibub et al. 
(2010), Marshall & Jaggers (2011), and as 
cited in QoGst; Bormann & Golder (2013); 
DPI 
preselect Dummy indicating presidential election year (=1) Created using data from Golder (2005); 
Bormann, N.-C. & Golder, M. (2013); 
Consortium for Elections and Political Process 
Strengthening.  (2013) 
legelec Dummy indicating legislative/parliamentary election year 
(=1) 
Created using data from Golder (2005) 
Bormann, N.-C. & Golder, M. (2013); 
Consortium for Elections and Political Process 
Strengthening (2013) no_preselec 0= no presidential elections conducted or observed since 
establishment of regime or 1946; 1=known last election 
date and regime conducts elections 
Created based on legelec; DPI 
t_leg leg_last*no_legelec  
t_pres pres_last*no_preselec  
Van_index “This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy 
– competition and participation –measured as the %age of 
votes not cast for the largest party (Competition) times the 
%age of the population who actually voted in the election 
(Participation). This product is divided by 100 to form an 
index that in principle could vary from 0 (no democracy) 
to 100 (full democracy). (Empirically, however, the 
largest value is 49.)” 
Vanhanen (2011) as cited in QoGst 
                                                 
5 Abbreviations stand for:  
DPI Keefer (2013) 
IFS International Monetary Fund (2013a) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (2009) 
PWT7 Heston et al. (2012) 
PWT8 Feenstra et al. (2013) 
QoGst Teorell et al. (2013) 
RR Reinhart & Rogoff (2010b) 
TED The Conference Board (2013) 
WDI World Bank (2013b) 
WEO International Monetary Fund (2013c) 
33 
 
fh_status Freedom House status; (1) free (2) partial free (3) not free  Freedom House (2013) as cited in QoGst; 
where single values were missing the value of 
the previous year was used 
wpr_3spot 
 
World oil-price index (Index number: 00176AADZF) International Monetary Funds (2013b) 
wpr_3spot_growth Logarithmic returns of wpr_3spot (in %)  
gdp_pc_curr GDP per capita (current US$) WDI 
gdp_pc_growth GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
 
WDI 
g7_us US T-Bill IFS 
g7_us_vol US T-Bill volatility (approximated with the square root of 
the 5-year variance) 
IFS 
libor_6us_vol 
 
libor_6_us volatility (approximated with the square root 
of the 5-year variance) 
Calculated using data from DataStream, Series: 
USY60LDE (Retrieved August 2013) 
infl Inflation in% per annum RR 
Infl_vol3 Volatility of infl (approximately, using the square-root of 
infl_variance). 
 
xrat_avg 
 
National Currency per USD, period average 
 
IFS; for the Euro Zone members the rate for 
'Euro Area' was used; for Ecuador 1960-1979: 
WDI (“Official exchange rate, period 
average”); for Indonesia 1960-1966: PWT7 
(“XRAT”); for Russia 1970-1992: United 
nations 2013 ("unna_er") as cited in QoGst; 
Taiwan 1970-2010: PWT7(“XRAT”) 
xrat_avg_vol3 xrat_avg volatility (approximated with square root of 
xrat_avg_variance) 
 
exp_gr Exports of goods and services (annual% growth) WDI 
exp_imp exp_usd divided by imp_usd  
tot 
 
“Terms of trade adjustment (constant LCU) Net barter 
terms of trade index is calculated as the%age ratio of the 
export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes, 
measured relative to the base year 2000” 
WDI 
trade_gdp 
 
“…the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product.” (% of 
GDP) 
WDI 
ca_net Current Account, Net (excluding exceptional financing) IFS; for Taiwan & Algeria (1991-2004), 
Belgium (1980-2001), Central Africa (1995 
onwards), China 1980-1 & Hungary 1980-1 
WEO; El Salvador(up to ‘75),Egypt (up to 
’76), Ecuador (‘70-’75), Denmark, (‘70-’74), 
Cote D'Ivoire, (‘70-’74), Costa Rica (‘70-’76), 
Chile (‘70-’74), Brazil (‘70-’74), Algeria prior 
to 1977, Angola prior to 1985, Argentina prior 
to 1976, Bolivia prior to 1976 from Lane, P. 
R., & Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2007) 
debt_tot_ctr_gdp Total (domestic plus external) gross central government 
debt/GDP 
Calculated using data from RR; WDI; WEO; 
OECD 
debt_tot_ext_gdp 
 
Total external (public plus private) gross external  
Debt/GDP 
Calculated using data from RR; WDI; WEO; 
OECD 
Note:  This table contains information on the variable names (dependent and independent) alongside description and detail of each variable and sources.  
34 
 
Table 3 Determinants of Sovereign Defaults (proportional odds model – first default only) 
 General Logit Model  Specified Logit Model 
 Coef. Odds  
Ratio 
Coef. Coef.  Coef. Odds  
Ratio 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
regime 0.6140 1.8479  0.8863  1.2375 3.4468  0.9978* 
ht_region2 0.9296** 2.5335  0.6471*  0.9501** 2.5860  0.5947* 
preselect 2.1489 8.5756  2.7407**  3.3011* 27.1434  2.5070** 
no_preselec 3.5363 34.3413  1.8808  2.5156 12.3742  1.4823 
t_pres 0.1114 1.1179  0.1877**  0.1327 1.1419  0.1738* 
legelec -0.9910 0.3712  -1.2538  -1.7373 0.1760  -1.0520 
t_leg -0.3066 0.7360  -0.2395  -0.2975 0.7426  -0.1982 
van_index -0.0408 0.9600  -0.0095  -0.0535 0.9479  -0.0113 
fh_status=2 -5.4559*** 0.0043  -4.2457***  -6.6527*** 0.0013  -4.4019*** 
fh_status=3 -6.4132*** 0.0016  -4.8308***  -7.2892*** 0.0007  -5.0669*** 
g7_us 0.0818 1.0852 0.1386 0.0063  0.5291 1.6975 0.2288 0.1449 
g7_us_vol -2.3358 0.0967 -1.8334   -6.2885** 0.0019 -2.3581  
libor_6us_vol 2.1200 8.3310 1.7297   5.4688** 237.1661 2.2109  
ca_net 2.26e-11 1.0000 6.89e-12 7.01e-12  2.26e-11 1.0000 9.81e-12 5.82e-12 
infl 0.0575*** 1.0591 0.0285*** 0.0135***  0.0566*** 1.0582 0.0281*** 0.0122*** 
infl_vol3 -0.0617** 0.9402 -0.0298**   -0.0605** 0.9413 -0.0292**  
wpr_3spot 0.0787 1.0819 0.0436 0.0782**  0.0966 1.1015 0.0325 0.0675** 
wpr_3spot_growth -0.0146 0.9855 -0.0036 0.0045  -0.0072 0.9928 -0.0011 0.0012 
xrat_avg -0.0197** 0.9805 -0.0103* -0.0001  -0.0204** 0.9798 -0.0101** -0.0003 
xrat_avg_vol3 0.0329** 1.0335 0.0175**   0.0334** 1.0340 0.0170**  
exp_gr -0.1009** 0.9040 -0.0769** -0.0689**  -0.1200** 0.8869 -0.0768** -0.0658** 
tot -8.96e-14 1.0000 1.60e-14 1.11e-14  -8.83e-14 1.0000 1.56e-14 1.05e-14 
exp_imp 4.5991* 99.3923 4.1333** 4.2083**  5.4681* 236.9991 4.0618** 4.2866** 
trade_gdp -0.0263 0.9740 -0.0233 -0.0263  -0.0395 0.9613 -0.0249 -0.0345 
debt_tot_ext_gdp 0.0520** 1.0534 0.0344** 0.0289  0.0717*** 1.0743 0.0360** 0.0368* 
debt_tot_ctr_gdp 0.0394* 1.0402 0.0203 0.0377**  0.0434** 1.0443 0.0191 0.0340** 
gdp_pc_curr -0.0021*** 0.9979 -0.0012*** -0.0017***  -0.0021*** 0.9980 -0.0012*** -0.0016*** 
gdp_pc_growth -0.3452** 0.7081 -0.1522** -0.2822***  -0.3928*** 0.6752 -0.1496* -0.2605** 
cr_bk_lag1 3.5673*** 35.4200 1.9367*** 3.6698***  3.2828*** 26.6516 1.8599** 3.1232*** 
logt -2.8656* 0.0570 -0.9982 -2.6993**      
logt14       -7.0198** 0.0009 -0.9234 -3.0743 
e15      -14.7395** 0.0000 -2.3725 -8.1062* 
constant -12.3770** 
 
4.21E-06 
 
-8.9720*** -9.9068**  -11.5388** 
 
9.74E-06 
 
-9.6127*** -9.6616** 
Log likelihood -32.2681 -46.765 -38.8176  -30.1528 -46.9330 -39.8057 
Pseude R_square 0.7419  0.6313 0.6902  0.7589  0.6300 0.6823 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observations 1186  1270 1198  1186  1270 1198 
Note: This table contains regression estimates of duration (survival) analysis models. Two different models are specified and estimated. One without taking into account of significant increase in hazard up to 15 years and second which does. In both cases, table also 
presents odd ratio of first specification. For the sake of sensitivity analysis, table also contains coefficient estimates of two other specifications for each type of model. More specifically, in second specification (column 3), we drop political and regional variables while in 
third specification (column 4), we drop volatility variables.  *, **, ***significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. Dependent variable in each model specification is whether a country defaulted or not (1, 0 dummy variable (represented by cr_esd as explained in 
table 2)). The number of observations used in each model estimation differ due to missing values of certain independent variables. 
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Table 4 Determinants of Transition Out of and into Default (two-state model) 
 Transition out of Default  Transition into Default  
 Coef. Odds Ratio Coef. Coef.  Coef. Odds Ratio Coef. Coef. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
regime 0.4053 1.4997  0.2710  0.3905 1.4778  0.3248 
ht_region2 -0.1199 0.8870  -0.1292  -0.1166 0.8899  -0.1658 
preselec 0.0577 1.0594  -0.0360  0.2133 1.2378  0.2613 
no_preselec -1.6719 0.1879  -1.6406  0.9848 2.6772  0.7761 
t_pres -0.0889 0.9149  -0.1169  -0.0137 0.9864  0.0105 
legelec -0.3211 0.7254  -0.1879  -0.0410 0.9599  -0.1188 
t_leg -0.0165 0.9836  0.0084  0.1184 1.1256  0.1057 
van_index 0.0384 1.0392  0.0307  -0.0172 0.9829  -0.0137 
fh_status=2 -0.1395 0.8698  -0.1666  -0.8460 0.4291  -0.7250 
fh_status=3 -0.5682 0.5665  -0.3627  -2.9979*** 0.0499  -2.7327*** 
g7_us -0.1865** 0.8299 -0.1586** -0.1758**  0.2604*** 1.2975 0.2569*** 0.2379*** 
g7_us_vol -0.1101 0.8957 0.2564   -0.4702 0.6249 0.2031  
libor_6us_vol -0.1016 0.9034 -0.4202   0.2966 1.3453 -0.2950  
ca_net 5.55e-11 1.0000 8.53e-11* 3.88e-11  1.63e-11 *** 1.0000 9.97e-12* 1.51e-11** 
infl 0.0005 1.0005 0.0006 -0.0001  0.0184** 1.0186 0.0162** 0.0094*** 
infl_vol3 -0.0012 0.9988 -0.0012   -0.0134 0.9867 -0.0158  
wpr_3spot -0.0032 0.9968 -0.0061 -0.0013  0.0159** 1.0160 0.0132** 0.0101 
wpr_3spot_growth 1.6469 5.1909 1.5369 1.9461  -0.5892 0.5548 -0.6209 -0.8780 
xrat_avg -0.0000 1.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0002 0.9998 -0.0003 0.0003** 
xrat_avg_vol3 - 1.0000 -   0.0029* 1.0029 0.0030**  
exp_growth 0.0064 1.0064 0.0112 0.0008  0.0025 1.0025 -0.0057 0.0024 
tot -6.23e-14 1.0000 -6.52e-14 -4.83e-14  -9.03e-16 1.0000 4.71e-15 2.38e-14 
exp_imp -1.5325 0.2160 -1.9535** -0.9920  2.0400** 7.6908 1.3966* 2.2200*** 
trade_gdp -0.0019 0.9981 -0.0004 -0.0005  -0.0082 0.9919 -0.0140* -0.0085 
debt_tot_ext_gdp 0.0076 1.0077 0.0046 0.0080*  0.0018 1.0018 0.0055* 0.0030 
debt_tot_ctr_gdp -0.0235*** 0.9768 -0.0211** -0.0218***  0.0264*** 1.0267 0.0176*** 0.0238*** 
gdp_pc_curr 0.0003 1.0003 0.0004** 0.0002  -0.0001 0.9999 -0.0001*** -0.0001** 
gdp_pc_growth 0.0047 1.0047 0.0122 0.0312  -0.1556*** 0.8559 -0.1681*** -0.1530*** 
cr_bk_lag1 -0.8138 0.4432 -0.7659 -0.8429*  0.6407 1.8977 0.6309 0.6454 
logt -0.5472** 0.5786 -0.6275** -0.5392**  -0.0925 0.9117 -0.3818* -0.0132 
constant 3.6014* 36.6501 3.4820** 2.9775  -9.5209*** 0.0001 -6.0924*** -8.9457*** 
/lnsig2u -13.3696  -13.3276 -10.9666  -13.3696  -13.3276 -10.9666 
sigma_u 0.0012  0.0013 0.0042  0.0012  0.0013 0.0042 
e(sigma_u)^2 1.562e-06  1.629e-06 1.727e-05  1.562e-06  1.629e-06 1.727e-05 
rho 4.75e-07  4.95e-07 5.25e-06  4.75e-07  4.95e-07 5.25e-06 
LR-test( rho=0) 0.4980  0.4980 0.4970  0.4980  0.4980 0.4970 
Log likelihood -219.5420  -243.0418 -227.7908  -219.5420  -243.0418 -227.7908 
Number of observations 1953  2017 1968  1953  2017 1968 
Note: This table contains regression estimates of duration (survival) analysis models. For the sake of sensitivity analysis, three different specifications of the model are estimated. Table contains coefficient estimates of two other 
specifications alongside main specification results (column 1). More specifically, in second specification (column 3), we drop political and regional variables while in third specification, we drop volatility variables. Table also 
presents odd ratio of first specification.  *, **, ***significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. Dependent variable in each model specification is whether a country is out or into default (represented by y as explained in 
table 2)). The number of observations used in each model estimation differ due to missing values of certain independent variables.
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Figure 1 Survivor Function (first default only) 
  
Note. Survivor function estimates (proportion of countries not defaulting on sovereign loan payment at each time period). 
 
Figure 2 Hazard Function (first default only) 
 
Note. Hazard function estimates. Vertical lines show the 95% confidence interval.  
 
Figure 3 Differences in Hazard Rates Before/After t=15 (e15=1 up to 15 years and e15=1 beyond 15 years) 
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